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THE INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL




The Federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),' celebrating its fifti-
eth birthday in this symposium, dominates the field of administrative law. Like
the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure, the APA prescribes the man-
ner in which countless thousands of federal adjudicatory and rulemaking pro-
ceedings are conducted each year. In that sense, the APA has achieved quasi-
constitutional status. The Act has been the subject of innumerable judicial deci-
sions and vast quantities of scholarship.
A reformer who sets out to modernize a state's APA necessarily turns first
to what is most familiar: the Federal APA. The pathways of that statute are
embedded in every administrative lawyer's mental map. If a federal provision
seems to have worked well, that provision is the logical starting point in draft-
ing a state law. If a provision has generated major problems in application, that
lesson should also be taken to heart.
On October 15, 1995, Governor Pete Wilson signed Senate Bill 523 ("S.B.
523"), California's new Administrative Procedure Act, into law.2 This was a
happy day for quite a few people, including the author of this article who
served as consultant for the California Law Revision Commission ("Commis-
sion") in its seven-year effort to propose and enact a new APA.3 The Tulsa
t Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. The opinions herein are the author's, not necessarily those of
the California Law Revision Commission. Thanks to Karl Engeman and Nat Sterling for reading drafts of this
article.
I. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5 U.S.C.).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11400-11529 (West Supp. 1996) (enacted by S.B. 523, ch. 938, §§ 21-51,
1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5533-62 (West)). The APA revisions are applicable to an administrative proceeding
commenced on or after July 1, 1997. The new APA, together with most of the Law Revision Commission's
section-by-section comments, can be found in West's Annotated California Codes (Supp. 1996).
3. The California Law Revision Commission is an independent state agency charged with recommend-
ing reforms of state law. The Commission has considerable credibility with the legislature which was of great
assistance in getting the new APA passed. In addition to a small paid staff, the members of the Commission
are volunteer lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff members. Commission members convene for
one-day or two-day meetings several times a year to review studies and recommend legislation on a wide
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Law Journal's invitation to contribute an article to this symposium provided a
welcome opportunity to reflect on the lengthy law reform process that culminat-
ed in enactment of S.B. 523. In particular, the invitation prompted an inquiry
about the influence of the Federal APA on California's S.B. 523.
I. CALIFORNIA'S APA AND S.B. 523
California's original APA was a pioneering effort. It was proposed by the
California Judicial Council4 whose report cited the report of the Federal Attor-
ney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure' on nearly every page.
Enacted in 1945,6 a year before the Federal APA, California's APA was the
first state administrative procedure statute of any consequence." The Act flew
in the face of the conclusion of New York's Benjamin Commission that a state
APA was inadvisable.8
In many respects California's 1945 legislation was far ahead of its time.
For example, it created a central panel of independent hearing officers9 - an
idea that is only now spreading throughout the states and has yet to be adopted
by the federal government. But as the decades passed, the defects in the 1945
statute became apparent. The most significant shortcoming was that the 1945
APA applied only to occupational licensing agencies and a few others."0 Per-
variety of subjects. I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the members of the Commission and
the staff who made a massive effort to draft and enact the new APA. I would also like to acknowledge the
efforts of Senator Quentin Kopp (I-San Francisco) and his staff. Senator Kopp carried the bill and his un-
flinching support for it helped to navigate the legislative shoals and bring the bill safely into port.
Readers who wish to obtain documents or studies cited herein can write the Commission at 4000
Middlefield Rd., Ste. D-2, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4739. The Commission's phone number is (415) 494-1335
and its e-mail address is nsterling@clrc.ca.gov.
4. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE
OF 1944, at 8-30 (1944) [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT]. See also John G. Clarkson, The History of
the California Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 246-47 (1964).
5. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1941). The majority of
the Committee recommended a federal statute whose provisions on adjudication had quite limited scope. See
id. at 195-202. California's 1945 APA was vastly more ambitious than that recommended by the Committee's
majority.
6. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 867, 1945 Cal. Stat. 1626. The provisions on rulemaking were
added in 1947, Act of July 17, 1947, ch. 1425, 1947 Cal. Stat. 2984, and were heavily amended in 1979, Act
of September 11, 1979, ch. 567, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1778.
7. California's existing APA is contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11340-11529 (West 1992). The
portion of the APA concerned with adjudication is sections 11500-11529; the adjudication provisions were
amended, but not repealed, by S.B. 523.
8. ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 35-36 (1942).
9. See § 11502. Originally, the Act allowed agencies to choose between their in-house hearing officers
and those from the central panel. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-15; Norman Abrams,
Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 487, 495 (1977). Beginning in
1961, agencies were required to use central panel hearing officers to the exclusion of in-house officers. See id.
at 495-98. Hearing officers were renamed administrative law judges (AUs) in 1985. See Act of July 29, 1985,
ch. 324, §§ 16-17, 1985 Cal. Stat. 1434-35 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11502-11502.1 (West 1992)).
10. The Judicial Council's recommendations for a new APA covered only licensing agencies because
resource limitations prevented the Council from studying other agencies, but the Council expressed hope that
its work would be adapted to nonlicensing agencies such as tax, workers' compensation, public utilities, and
benefit adjudications. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-10, 28-29. See also Ralph N. Kleps,
California's Approach to the Improvement of Administrative Procedure, 32 CAL. L. REV. 416, 419 (1944).
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haps 95% of the adjudicatory proceedings conducted by state agencies were not
covered by the APA at all.
Starting in 1989, the Law Revision Commission began studying adminis-
trative law in the hope that it could recommend a new statute to the legisla-
ture." The project was complex and difficult, far more controversial than the
relatively non-political law reforms usually tackled by the Commission. Yet the
Commission has no independent political base in the legislature; its recommen-
dations stand little chance of passage unless they command broad bipartisan
consensus. In 1994-95, the legislative environment was particularly difficult be-
cause of intense partisan squabbling over the speakership of the Assembly.
The Commission split the administrative law project into three parts
adjudication, judicial review, and rulemaking. This was shrewd political strategy
because each of the three parts was likely to attract a different set of opponents.
Taking each part separately at least minimized the chances that a strong coali-
tion would emerge to kill the entire bill in the legislature or persuade the gover-
nor to veto it. In addition, each of the three reforms were quite complex and
each presented many points of controversy as well as difficult drafting prob-
lems, even for the nonpareil draftspersons employed by the Law Revision Com-
mission. After seven years, the Commission had only finished with adjudica-
tion, although the judicial review project was far advanced.' It made sense to
complete one discrete part of the package and take it to the legislature before
consuming any more time and without creating even more complexity and
confusion.
The Commission's objective was to produce a good bill that would com-
mand as close to consensus as possible. Yet there were numerous players before
The Council's proposed judicial review provisions covered all state and local agencies. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1996). Over the years, the APA adjudication sections were expanded to cover a
few non-licensing agencies engaged in prosecutorial activity such as the Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission and the Fair Political Practices Commission. It also covers certain personnel decisions of local school
boards and community colleges. For a handy though somewhat outdated list of agency hearing requirements,
see CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PRACTICE 287-370 (1984).
11. The administrative law study was authorized by the legislature. See Res. ch. 47(24), 1987 Cal. Stat.
5897, 5899. The author prepared four studies on administrative adjudication and three studies on judicial
review. These studies are as follows:
I. "Administrative Adjudication: Structural Issues" (1989)
2. "Appeals Within the Agency" (1990)
3. "Administrative Impartiality" (1991)
4. "The Adjudication Process" (1991), in CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'M, ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION BY STATE AGENCIES 447-542 (1995) [hereinafter "The Adjudication Process"]
5. "Judicial Review: Standing and Timing" (1992)
6. "The Scope of Judicial Review" (1993)
7. "A Modem Judicial Review Statute to Replace Administrative Mandamus" (1993)
See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamentals,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1992) [hereinafter Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals] (incorporating studies 1, 2,
and 3); Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1995) [hereinafter Asimow, Scope of Review] (incorporating study 6).
12. Discussion of the judicial review bill is beyond the scope of this article. Among many other provi-
sions, that bill will abolish California's baroque system of judicial review through various forms of the writ of
mandamus and will limit or abolish California's idiosyncratic system of judicial independent judgment of
agency fact findings. See Asimow, Scope of Review, supra note 11; Studies 5, 6 and 7, supra note 11. The
study of rulemaking is on the drawing board but has not yet begun.
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the Commission, in the legislature, and in the governor's office. Many agencies
tenaciously represented their perceived interests during the Commission's delib-
erations. The Attorney General, the Office of Administrative Law, private prac-
titioners, Bar associations, administrative law judges, 3 and regulated parties all
had their own axes to grind. Some factions vigorously opposed portions of the
Commission's original proposals. The members of the Commission themselves
approached the issues with sharply differing points of view toward government
regulation and toward the differences between adjudication in court and before
agencies. That nearly all the players could ultimately join together in support of
a single bill was a fairly miraculous event. Possibly, the seven year deliberative
process exhausted everyone.
Because of the need to attract consensus, truly radical changes in adminis-
trative adjudication were never seriously considered. For example, early in the
process, there were calls from Bar groups and ALJs for an external separation
of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, especially in licensing cases. 4
These proposals would have stripped agency heads of their adjudicatory powers,
either by empowering ALJs to make final agency decisions or by creating ap-
pellate tribunals to make the final agency decisions. This sort of change was
never in the cards. Even if it was a good idea, and I had deep reservations
about applying external separation across the board, 5 it would have been polit-
ically impossible. Similarly, calls to expand California's system of independent
ALJs to new domains (remember, California's APA applies now only to occu-
pational licensing agencies and a few other areas) also foundered; the merits of
separating in-house ALJs from their agencies seemed problematic 6 and the
opposition was intense. Nor was any attempt made to prescribe administrative
procedure for the vast and diverse array of local government agencies."
The dire fiscal condition of California government was an ever-present
backdrop for Commission and legislative consideration of S.B. 523. The reces-
sion of the early 1990's hit California hard and triggered a series of harrowing
budget crises. The budgets of state agencies were cut to the bone. Staffs were
sharply pared. Yet these cuts were seldom accompanied by any diminution in
regulatory responsibility. As a result of all this, it was an accepted constraint
that APA reform could not cost very much, if anything.
Therefore, the Commission decided early on not to disturb the basic and
familiar pattern of California administrative adjudication. Most cases would
13. The term "administrative law judges" (and the abbreviation ALs) is used herein to refer to the
whole panoply of California administrative trial judges and hearing officers. It includes but is not limited to
central panel ALJs.
14. In reality, large portions of administrative adjudication are already subject to an external separation
of functions. Workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, state personnel, attorney discipline, alco-
holic beverage licensing, worker safety, and welfare cases are all adjudicated by tribunals separated from
agencies responsible for law enforcement, prosecution, and advocacy. However, numerous important agencies,
including those responsible for professional licensing, exercise combined functions.
15. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1152-65.
16. See id. at 1181-91.
17. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11410.30, 11410.40 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing local agencies to volun-
tarily adopt the Act or any of its provisions.)
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continue to be heard by ALJs who would prepare proposed decisions; the final
agency decision would remain the responsibility of the agency heads. ALJs who
were in-house would remain in-house. The challenge to the Commission was to
craft a set of modest procedural protections for private sector litigants consistent
with these political and economic constraints while also seeking ways to make
agency adjudication less costly, formal and adversarial.
The Commission conducted innumerable public hearings. Always open to
input from the public and private sectors and always in search of consensus, the
Commission struck countless compromises along the way. By the time S.B. 523
reached the legislature, there was little left to fight about."8 The ultimate prod-
uct was less ambitious than the one I envisioned in my studies for the Commis-
sion and less ambitious than what I would have preferred, but it was probably
the most far reaching legislation that had any chance of passage.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW CALIFORNIA APA
The attempt to revamp the adjudication provisions of California's APA
was bedeviled from the start by a difficult structural problem. California admin-
istrative adjudication has two tiers. Tier 1, to which the adjudication provisions
of the existing APA apply, covers some sixty-three agencies,"9 most of which
handle occupational licensing (I refer to these as the "licensing agencies," al-
though that is not completely accurate20). Hearings in licensing cases are con-
ducted by a panel of approximately forty ALJs employed by the Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearings ("OAH") and assigned to the various agencies as need-
ed." The law governing Tier 1 works reasonably well; although some tinker-
ing was desirable, the existing Act did not require wholesale revision.
However, the adjudication provisions of the existing APA cover less than
5% of the total number of state-level adjudications. As a result, there is a huge
Tier 2 which includes major state adjudicating agencies, such as those deciding
workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, welfare, personnel, labor
18. Only two significant amendments of the Bill occurred during the legislative process. The State Board
of Equalization's successful effort to get out of the bill is described in text at notes 47-50. The second was a
classic example of special interest politics. The present APA calls for all adjudicatory proceedings to be tran-
scribed; the consent of both parties is necessary in order to dispense with a stenographic reporter and to tape
the proceedings. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11512(d) (West 1992). The bill that went to the legislature would
have allowed a central-panel AUJ discretion to dispense with the reporter in licensing cases. This would have
resulted in a clear and obvious cost saving. In the vast majority of cases, the agency heads accept the AL's
proposed decision (or accept it and lower the penalty) without calling for a transcript and the case is never
judicially reviewed. In those cases, paying a reporter to take down the proceedings is a sheer waste of money.
In numerous non-APA cases, taping is already employed without any significant technical problems. See "The
Adjudication Process," supra note 11, at 104-06. But political realities overwhelmed common sense. The
shorthand reporters are well organized; their trade association had the Senate Government Operations Com-
mittee wired. That committee gave the proponents the choice of deleting the taping provision or deferring
consideration of the bill. Hearing on S.B. 523 Before the Senate Gov't Ops. Comm., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1995). That was the end of taped licensing hearings.
19. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11501(b) (West 1992).
20. See supra note 10.
21. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11370.1-11370.5 (West 1992).
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relations, and environmental cases. Additionally, numerous minor adjudicating
agencies are not covered by the existing Act.22 Each Tier 2 agency has its own
procedural statute and regulations, its own stable of in-house ALJs, and its own
uncodified hearing practices and customs.
Maintaining and improving the two-tier system, within the political and
economic constraints already described, presented a difficult drafting problem.
The drafters wanted to maintain the high level of procedural protection provided
in Tier 1 licensing cases. They also wanted to achieve some base-line procedur-
al projections for Tier 2 cases, but without significantly increasing the cost and
formality of the process. It was infeasible to transplant the minutely-detailed
procedures required under Tier 1 into all Tier 2 cases because of cost concerns
and because Tier 2 cases vary enormously. Tier 2 cases run the gamut from the
twenty minute hearings provided in unemployment cases to complex and time
consuming labor and environmental adjudication. Obviously, the same proce-
dures cannot be appropriate for all Tier 2 agencies. For example, the carefully
wrought discovery provisions applicable under Tier I could not possibly be
extended without major modification to the vast array of Tier 2 adjudications.
Finally, to compound the drafting problem, the Commission wanted to enact a
set of procedural reforms applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 adjudication that
would encourage alternate dispute resolution ("ADR") and would make adjudi-
cation less formal and costly.
Therefore, the legislation somehow had to embody three APAs within one:
1) one APA would insure a fundamental level of procedural protection in both
Tier 1 and 2 adjudications; 2) a second APA would provide modest reforms in
Tier 1 cases covered by the existing APA; 3) a third APA would provide for
ADR and authorize other flexibility and informality-promoting practices in both
tiers. This structural problem of having three APAs within one made the result-
ing legislative product complex to draft and the final legislation difficult to
explain.
My original solution was to enact some modifications to the existing APA,
then apply that existing APA (as modified) to all Tier 2 agencies, with most
provisions functioning as defaults. Then the Tier 2 agencies would be invited to
adopt regulations to change or delete the default provisions. For example, the
Tier 2 agencies would be required to provide the same scheme of discovery as
Tier 1 agencies unless they chose to adopt regulations modifying or totally
deleting the discovery provisions.' The provisions applying ADR and infor-
mality would apply across-the-board. This came to be known as the "big bang"
approach to adjudication reform.
In my opinion, the rulemaking process called for by the big bang approach
would have been a healthy one. It would have provided the impetus for agen-
22. Some licensing cases are not covered by Tier 1. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra
note 11, at 1073 n.12. These fall into Tier 2.
23. See "The Adjudication Process," supra note 11, at 2-3. Provisions representing due process funda-
mentals, such as the ban on ex parte contacts, could not be altered or dispensed with by regulation.
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cies to examine all of their procedures, often for the first time in many years,
and would have resulted in an updated and comprehensive procedural code.
Members of the public and regulated industries would have been involved in
this reconsideration and the viewpoints of commentators would have been con-
sidered in making final rules.
However, the big bang approach provoked a firestorm of criticism. The
Attorney General was the leading critic.24 While the Attorney General conced-
ed that some provisions of the big'bang proposal were desirable, he argued that
no case had been made for root and branch reform. In particular, the Attorney
General noted that big bang required all Tier 2 agencies to engage in
rulemaking to adapt the default provisions of the Act to their own special situa-
tions. Yet the fiscal austerity confronting virtually all agencies powerfully mili-
tated against any new chores or new costs. The California rulemaking provi-
sions are exacting and costly to comply with; the rulemaking path bristles with
time-consuming hurdles.' As a consequence, agencies complained that they
would have to go through a complex and costly rulemaking proceeding - for
which they lacked the personnel and budget - to get back to where they were
in the first place.
The Attorney General's criticism led to a creative compromise that avoided
the rulemaking imbroglio and satisfied all sides - the "little bang" approach.
Under little bang, the three-in-one structure of S.B. 523 emerged: 1) an admin-
istrative adjudication bill of rights, setting forth basic fundamentals of adminis-
trative justice and applicable to both Tier 1 and 2 agencies;' 2) a modest set
of improvements applicable only to Tier 1 agencies;27 and 3) a set of flexibili-
ty enhancing provisions applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 agencies.28
III. CRITICAL ISSUES IN S.B. 523 AND THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL APA
This section will provide an overview of a number of the most important
policy decisions embodied in S.B. 523. The objective is not to discuss these
provisions in any detail but instead to explain their background. Was a provi-
sion inspired by the Federal APA, by the various amendments to the Federal
APA, or by the 1981 Model State APA ("Model Act")?2 9 Or can a provision
be explained by a desire to depart from the model of the Federal APA or the
Model Act? Did a provision emerge from a political compromise or was it the
product of an exercise of political power?" Can it be explained by some exist-
24. See letter from Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, to the California Law Revision Commission
(May 11, 1994) (on file with the author).
25. See Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. iEV. 43, 48-51 (1992).
26. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5517, 5536-42 (West) (examining Articles 6-8 of § 21 of S. B. 523)
(codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11425.10-11435.65).
27. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5517, 5550-62 (West) (amending §§ 11500-11530).
28. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5517, 5535-36, 5542-50 (West) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 11420.10-11420.30, 11440.10-11470.50).
29. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981, 15 U.L.A. 1 (1990).
30. See supra note 18 and infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
1996]
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ing peculiarity of California law or government? Or by the desire to conserve
budgetary resources?
As already mentioned,3' there is no doubt that the federal experience was
a significant factor in shaping the various provisions in S.B. 523. I am steeped
in the Federal APA; my original studies that led to the Commission's recom-
mendations discussed the federal statute and case law at every point. The feder-
al model fits California well because California's bureaucratic apparatus rivals
that of many nations. Its agencies have large, well-trained staffs and a heavy
caseload. They administer an enormous range of regulatory statutes and adjudi-
cate cases ranging from simple, mostly pro se hearings to lengthy and complex
cases with specialized counsel. Many agencies are headed by full-time mem-
bers. Thus, federal models may be more appropriate in California than in small-
er states.
32
The 1981 Model Act was also an important guidance document for the
drafters of the California Act.33 The Model Act represents a recent, carefully
considered, state-of-the-art approach to state administrative law that is just now
beginning to be adopted by the states. It is much more sophisticated and ambi-
tious than its predecessors (the 1948 and 1961 Model Acts). It was obviously
desirable for California to capitalize on the enormous investment made by the
scholars, draftsmen, and members of the National Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Indeed, the Model Act was frequently the starting point for Com-
mission consideration. However, as the Commission was compelled to make
compromises and face the inevitable tradeoffs, many of the more ambitious
ideas in the Model Act fell by the wayside.
A. What Agencies Should Be Covered?
As already explained, S.B. 523 contains three acts in one: an administra-
tive adjudication bill of rights, a flexibility-enhancing package, and a set of
relatively minor improvements for licensing agencies.34 Ideally, the bill of
rights and flexibility-enhancers should apply across the board to adjudicatory
hearings of all Tier 2 agencies.35
In fact, the objective of "universal coverage" came close to being met.36
Numerous agencies tried to persuade the Commission to exclude all or part of
their functions from the new APA. For the most part, the Commission stoutly
resisted these blandishments. Instead, it designed statutory exceptions to deal
31. See supra text following note 1.
32. See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 2.1.2, at 30-36 (1986).
33. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 1I, at 1079-80.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
35. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1073-79.
36. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11405.30 (West Supp. 1996) which defines "agency" comprehensively, and
§ 11410.20(a) which provides: "[elxcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute: (a) This chapter applies
to all agencies of the state. (b) This chapter does not apply to the Legislature, the courts or judicial branch, or
the Governor or office of the Governor."
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with particular problems presented by particular regulatory schemes rather than
entirely excluding agencies or regulatory schemes.
Universal coverage was the objective of the 1981 Model Act, which in-
cludes all adjudication of every agency.37 On the surface, this is also the ap-
proach taken by the Federal APA. Provided that some other statute requires a
hearing on the record," the Federal APA covers the adjudications of every
federal agency.39 However, the reality at the federal level is entirely different
from the surface appearance. Congress has repeatedly excluded new adjudicat-
ing schemes from the Federal APA, largely to escape the rigidity of the ALJ
hiring and performance evaluation provisions of the Act. As a result, there is a
vast amount of non-APA federal adjudication.' As a practical matter, the adju-
dication provisions of the Federal APA now apply to Social Security disputes,
plus cases in a few traditional agencies such as the NLRB.4' The rest of the
federal adjudication universe is a motley collection guided by no overarching
procedural limitations other than due process.
California's new APA has done much better than the federal government
in imposing universal coverage for the bill of rights and flexibility enhancers.
Nevertheless, the Commission and the legislature fell short of imposing univer-
sal coverage for all California adjudications in which hearings are required by
either statutes or due process.42
1. The California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC")
The CPUC persuaded the Commission to exclude it from S.B. 523.' 3 The
CPUC engages in considerable adjudication, including individualized public
utility ratemaking and a wide variety of licensing and penalty cases.' Never-
theless, the CPUC engaged in a tenacious and ultimately successful campaign to
win an exemption from the new APA. The CPUC's representative showed up at
every Commission meeting, arguing that ratemaking should be treated as
rulemaking rather than adjudication. He argued persistently that whatever spe-
37. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 1-102(1), 15 U.L.A. 10-11 (1990). The real-
ity, of course, is different. In states that have adopted part or all of the Model Act, the legislatures have ex-
empted numerous agencies from its coverage. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-503 (1989), discussed in Steve
A. Leben, Survey of Kansas Law: Administrative Law, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 679, 683 (1989); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-46b-1(2) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.030 (vest Supp. 1996).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). See also infra discussion in text accompanying notes 52-53, 57-58.
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
40. At the federal level, there are more than twice as many "administrative judges," adjudicating cases
outside the APA, as there are ALJs who adjudicate cases under the APA. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE U. S., 1992 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 789 (1992) [hereinafter ACUS REPORT].
41. See id. at 843-49, 863.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 51-78.
43. See S.B. 523, § 85, amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1701. In 1947, the CPUC was similarly suc-
cessful in gaining an exemption from the rulemaking provisions of the APA. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11351(a) (West 1992).
44. An adjudicative "decision" is defined as "agency action of specific application that determines a
legal right, duty, privilege, immunity, or other legal interest of a particular person." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11405.50(a) (West Supp. 1996). The comment to this section makes clear that adjudication covers individu-
alized ratemaking and licensing decisions.
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cific provision was under discussion, it would not work at the CPUC and would
have to be extensively modified to take account of the CPUC's eccentric prac-
tices. For a while, the Commission tried to accommodate the CPUC, but the
result was a series of narrowly focussed provisions that complicated and dis-
tended the Act.' Finally, the Commission relented and completely excluded
the CPUC from the Act. The CPUC's lobbying campaign was a stellar success.
2. Regents of the University of California ("Regents of U.C.")
The Regents of U.C. conduct a large amount of adjudication - for exam-
ple, student disciplinary proceedings and personnel disputes. However, early in
the process the Regents of U.C. were excluded from the Act on the ground of
their constitutional immunity from regulation." Thus, the ironic result is that
adjudication relating to students or employees that is conducted by the Califor-
nia State University and College System is covered by the APA, but similar
proceedings conducted by the Regents of U.C. are not.
3. State Board of Equalization ("SBE")
The SBE is California's tax adjudication agency. It administers the busi-
ness taxes (such as the sales tax) and adjudicates disputes under those taxes. In
addition, it adjudicates income tax disputes, but does not administer the income
tax statute. The members of the SBE are elected by popular vote. They tend to
view themselves more as politicians with responsibility to their constituents than
as adjudicators or rulemakers.
SBE's system of adjudication is primitive. 7 For example, the 5-member
Board hears every income tax case en banc. It has a rudimentary system of
hearing officers who hear business tax cases; however, it has staunchly rejected
classification of these hearing officers as ALJs (apparently because reclassifica-
tion would give them a pay increase). Ex parte contact between taxpayers and
Board members is said to be commonplace, because Board members view such
contacts as a legitimate constituent service. Additionally, Board members decide
cases of persons who have contributed to their campaigns,4" and separation of
45. Two such provisions survived elimination of the CPUC from the Act. Section 11430.70(b) allows ex
parte contact with an agency head in individualized ratemaking proceedings if the content of the communica-
tion is disclosed on the record and all parties have an opportunity to comment on it. See Asimow, Adjudi-
cation Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1130-34. Section 1 1430.30(c)(1) allows adversary staff members to
advise decisionmakers concerning a technical issue in a nonprosecutorial matter, where the advice is needed
by and not otherwise reasonably available to the presiding officer. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.30(c)(1)
(West Supp. 1996). Again such advice must be disclosed on the record and an opportunity to comment pro-
vided.
46. See CAL. CONST. ART. 9, § 9. See also S.B. 523, § 6, adding CAL. EDUC, CODE § 92001 (West
Supp. 1996).
47. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1165 n.334 (describing California's tax
adjudication system as a patchwork based on historic accidents or, less charitably, as a mess).
48. Under § 15626(c), a Board member is disqualified from deciding or influencing a case in which "the
member knows or has reason to know that he or she received a contribution [of $250] or more [from a tax-
payer] within the preceding 12 months." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15626(d) (West 1992). This provision obvious-
ly places a premium on making the contribution more than 12 months before the matter comes on for deci-
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functions is largely ignored. The SBE believes in a true institutional method: its
advocates engage in off-record discussions with both hearing officers and Board
members about specific cases.
Thus, the Bill of Rights provisions relating to separation of functions,
pecuniary bias, and ex parte contact would have fundamentally changed the
way the SBE functions. After a few initial submissions, the SBE remained
silent during Commission deliberations. But once S.B. 523 reached the legisla-
ture, the SBE conducted an all-out lobbying campaign to win exclusion from
the Act. Several Board members were former legislators; they contacted the
present legislators with their concerns. The California Taxpayers Association
("CTA"), which represents the largest corporate taxpayers, lobbied vigorously to
exclude SBE, even though the reforms in the Bill were primarily pro-taxpayer.
But CTA persuaded the Republican caucus that the bill was "unfriendly to
taxpayers.""9 These largest taxpayers, evidently, wanted to maintain their
backdoor access to decisionmakers and their ability to influence decisions
through making strategic campaign contributions.
In a dramatic confrontation before the Assembly Consumer Protection,
Governmental Efficiency, and Economic Development Committee, the SBE
won exclusion from the bill on a 7-6 party line vote. All Republicans voted for
exclusion, following the recommendation of their caucus; all Democrats voted
to keep SBE in the bill. To the author of this article, this Committee decision
was the biggest single disappointment of the entire process."
B. What Proceedings Should Be Covered?
The decision as to precisely which adjudications should be covered by the
new APA presented thorny policy problems. The original California APA ap-
plied only to hearings that were specifically required by statute to be covered
by the APA.5' As already noted, this meant largely licensing cases (and some
of them were excluded as well). The scope of the Federal APA is broader; it
applies to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."52 The federal formulation
may, but probably does not, include hearings required by procedural due pro-
sion. A huge loophole to this provision permits a member who has received a contribution requiring disquali-
fication to return the contribution and then participate in the decision. See id. Anecdotal evidence available to
the author suggests this loophole is frequently employed; the returned contribution can then be recontributed
when the member stands for reelection.
49. Memorandum from Assembly Republican Caucus to members of the Assembly Consumer Protection,
Governmental Efficiency, and Economic Development Committee (June 20, 1995) (on file with the author).
The memorandum disingenuously argued that the bill of rights would lead to costly formalization of SBE
procedures, ignoring the provisions in the bill for informal hearings.
50. S. B. 523, § 54, enacts CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15609.5, excluding SBE from the provisions of the
APA; § 87 amends CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19044 (West Supp. 1996) to exclude Franchise Tax Board
hearings.
51. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11501(a) (West 1992). Only California and Connecticut use this approach.
See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 63 IOWA L. REV. 285, 339 n.200 (1977).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
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cess.5 3 The 1981 Model Act, like several modem state statutes,54 takes a differ-
ent tack: it covers all adjudications, regardless of whether any external source
(statutory or constitutional) requires an on-the-record hearing." As will be ex-
plained, S.B. 523 struck a compromise between the federal and Model Act
approaches. The Model Act approach proved to be too broad, but the federal
approach was judged to be too narrow. This critical provision in the California
statute, therefore, reflects a determination that the Federal APA is seriously
flawed.
My original opinion was in favor of the 1981 Model Act approach.56 The
Federal APA approach is unsatisfactory because it is often unclear whether a
particular external source actually calls for an on-the-record hearing that would
fall under the APA as opposed to some kind of informal hearing that would not
be covered. This uncertainty has led to quite a disparity in case law.57 The fed-
eral approach also encounters the due process enigma: when, if ever, should
hearings required by due process, but not a statute, fall under the APA?5" In
the end, why should it matter whether another statute requires a hearing on the
record? Should not the default rule be that the APA applies to all important
adjudications? A departure from that default rule should require clear legisla-
tion. These arguments made the 1981 Model Act provision seem attractive.
In an early Commission decision, however, the 1981 Model Act approach
was rejected in favor of the federal approach. Essentially, the Model Act ap-
proach was subjected to death by ridicule. One Commission member asked -
would the 1981 Model Act approach really require application of the APA to:
the decision by a state high school to select cheerleaders; imposition of a library
fine; a state forest ranger's decision in allocating campsites; every decision
affecting a state prisoner that the prisoner dislikes; a decision not to hire some-
53. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950). The Supreme Court held that the
APA applied to deportation cases where a hearing was required by due process. In the Court's view, Congress
would have desired at least the same level of protection in cases where a hearing was mandated by the consti-
tution as in cases where the hearing was mandated by a mere statute. However, this decision is unlikely to be
followed today and is widely ignored. Since due process requires hearings in mass justice situations, it is
inappropriate to require full-fledged formal APA adjudication procedure in every such case. See, e.g., Chemi-
cal Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding the APA not applicable
even though due process applies); Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding the APA
inapplicable to prison hearings required by due process); Robert E. Zahler, Note, The Requirement of Formal
Adjudication under Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 194, 218-41
(1975).
54. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1090 n.70 (referring to statutes in Dela-
ware, Florida, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin).
55. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 1-102(5), 15 U.L.A. 11 (1990) ("order
means an agency action of particular applicability"); § 4-101(a) ("agency shall conduct adjudicative proceed-
ing as the process for formulating ... an order").
56. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1081-94.
57. Compare City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 641-45 (7th Cir. 1983) ("hearing" in nuclear
licensing case does not mean "hearing on the record") with Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572
F.2d 872, 877-79 (1st Cir. 1978) (contra). More recent decisions have left this interpretive question to the
agency under the Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-83
(D.C. Cir. 1989). This author finds it disturbing that an agency should be allowed to decide whether or not its
hearings should comply with the APA.
58. See supra note 53.
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one for a low-level state job or to buy a computer from vendor A rather than
B?
The answer was - well yes, but hearings in relatively trivial state/private
encounters could be provided through an informal summary hearing proce-
dure.59 But what if the summary hearing procedure statute left out a category
of relatively trivial cases? Would some of the categories be mushy?" What if
the agency neglected to adopt a rule providing for summary procedure for a
particular category?6 And what if even the truncated summary procedure was
too much procedure for some relatively trivial encounter?62 The Commission
thought it would be laughed out of town if it proposed a statute requiring any
sort of procedure in such trivial matters.
I now believe the Commission's decision was correct. The 1981 Model
Act approach is overambitious. It would be a mistake to attempt to prescribe
procedures - any procedures - for the infinite range of relatively trivial inter-
actions between government and the public. One recent Florida case' illus-
trates the point well. The Florida APA applies "in all proceedings in which the
substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency."'  The court held
that the denial of admission to the University of Florida College of Law did not
"rise to the level of a 'substantial interest."'65 Of course, to the disappointed
applicant, the denial of admission to this professional school was a very sub-
stantial interest indeed. However, the court stated:
If such hopes and aspirations were deemed substantial interests, all unsuc-
cessful applicants for admission to a state university would be entitled to
a formal hearing upon the denial of their applications. While this scenario
is not the basis for our denial of Metsch's claim, we cannot ignore the
repercussions that would flow from granting the relief which he seeks.'
59. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 §§ 4-502 to 4-506. Summary procedure ap-
plies to "any matter having only trivial potential impact upon the affected parties" which presumably takes in
the campsite case and arguably covers the cheerleader. It applies to "a reprimand, warning, disciplinary report,
or other purely verbal sanction without continuing impact against a prisoner." Id. §§ 4-502(3)(ii), (viii). It
includes monetary sanctions up to $100 (which covers the library fine) and "denial of an application for ad-
mission to an educational institution or for employment" (which covers the job hypo), and "the acquisi-
tion ... of property or the procurement of goods or services by contract" (which covers the computer hypo).
Id. § 4-502(3).
60. Consider the case of the cheerleader supra note 59.
61. Model Act § 4-502(3) requires that an agency rule provide for summary procedure.
62. Summary procedure requires that a presiding officer (that is, anyone exercising authority over the
matter) allow "each party an opportunity to be informed of the agency's view of the matter and to explain the
party's view of the matter." MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE Act OF 1981 § 4-503(b)(1). The presiding
officer must furnish "a brief statement of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and policy reasons for the deci-
sion if it is an exercise of agency discretion,. . . and a notice of any available administrative review." Id. § 4-
503(b)(2). These explanations can be oral unless a monetary sanction is involved. See id. § 4-503(c). The
agency must review the order resulting from a summary hearing if any party requests a review. See id. § 4-
504. A "reviewing officer [must] give each party an opportunity to explain the party's view of the matter." Id.
§ 4-505(3).
63. See Metsch v. University of Florida, 550 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West 1996).
65. Metsch, 550 So. 2d at 1151. In an alternative ground, the court held that the applicant fell within an
exception for "any proceeding in which the substantial interests of a student are determined by the State Uni-
versity System." Id.
66. Id. at 1150-51.
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Clearly the Florida court was apprehensive that many of the thousands of
disappointed applicants to various Florida institutions of higher learning would
demand time-and-resource-consuming hearings. The court understandably drew
back from this abyss. Granted, Florida law did not contain a summary hearing
procedure, but even that procedure - any procedure - might not be worth the
bother in cases of disappointed applicants for the limited number of slots in
educational institutions. The same is true of many of the disputes that seem to
fall under the 1981 Model Act summary procedure provision.
In our litigation-oriented society (and perhaps California is even more
litigious than other states), a few people who resent being denied admission to a
university or being turned down for a job, a contract, or whatever, are going to
litigate the question of whether the procedure they received met the require-
ments of the summary procedure statute. The near certainty of this sort of
pointless litigation was enough to persuade the Commission to jettison the all-
inclusive Model Act approach to defining the scope of the Act.
California struck a compromise between the Federal APA approach and the
1981 Model Act approach. The bill of rights and flexibility enhancers apply "to
a decision by an agency if, under the federal or state Constitution or a federal
or state statute, an evidentiary hearing for determination of facts is required for
formulation and issuance of the decision."'67 This provision is considerably
more inclusive than the federal approach. First, the provision explicitly applies
to cases in which a hearing is required by either the federal or state constitu-
tion. As previously noted, the federal statute probably does not apply when a
hearing is required by due process, although the point remains unclear.68 As a
result, under federal law when a court determines that individualized govern-
ment action has deprived a person of liberty or property, it is often necessary to
apply the utilitarian, case-specific balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge69 to
custom tailor the necessary elements of a hearing and its timing.
The array of cases in which a hearing is required by California due process
is much broader than under the U. S. Constitution. 0 California has rejected
Board of Regents v. Roth.7 California law requires a hearing in many situa-
tions in which a person lacks an entitlement to a state benefit, because freedom
from arbitrary procedure is itself a liberty interest protected by due process. The
process that is due is determined not only by the three-factor Mathews v.
Eldridge test but, by weighing a fourth factor - the dignitary interest of the
person seeking the hearing.72
67. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11410.10 (West Supp. 1996). This language was drawn from California's
unique provision for administrative mandamus. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1996).
68. See supra note 53.
69. 424 U.S. 319, 347-49 (1976).
70. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1084-87.
71. 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
72. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979).
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The Commission thought it would be useful to have a framework in place
for situations in which federal or state due process calls for a trial-type hearing.
As discussed below, 3 the flexibility-enhancing provisions of S.B. 523 autho-
rize an "informal hearing" which falls far short of a formal adversarial trial. The
informal hearing consists of the presentation of written evidence plus oral argu-
ment with a minimum of live testimony and cross examination.74 All provi-
sions of the bill of rights apply to informal hearings. The statute explicitly
makes the informal hearing procedure available when an evidentiary hearing is
required by due process, even though the agency has not previously provided
for its use by regulations.7s The informal hearing satisfies due process in many
situations in which full-fledged courtroom theatrics are not required.76
Granted, there will still be cases in which it is unclear whether due process
is satisfied by an informal hearing. Nevertheless, it seemed constructive and
helpful to put an informal procedure in place that will satisfy due process de-
mands most of the time. This is particularly true of the cases of discretionary
government action in which the California Constitution but not the Federal
Constitution requires a hearing.7
Second, the California formulation avoids the need for the talismanic
words "on the record" which some federal cases say is needed to invoke the
adjudication provisions of the Federal APA." Chances are, if another statute
calls for a "hearing" or uses similar language, the APA will kick in. That other
statute will probably be read as calling for an "evidentiary hearing for deter-
mination of facts ... required for formulation and issuance of the decision."79
This formulation was drawn from existing language in the administrative man-
damus statute which provides review of adjudicatory agency decisions." Ad-
ministrative mandate cases have liberally classified all sorts of individualized
administrative proceedings as sufficiently adjudicatory in nature to trigger the
provision.' Thus California's default rule is that the bill of rights and flexi-
bility enhancing provisions in the new APA will apply to all state/private inter-
actions in which an external statute calls upon the agency to conduct some sort
73. See infra text accompanying notes 133-47.
74. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11445.40 (West Supp. 1996).
75. See id. § 11445.20(d). Under § 11445.10(b)(1), "It]he Legislature finds and declares the following:
(1) The informal hearing procedure is intended to satisfy due process and public policy requirements in a
manner that is simpler and more expeditious than hearing procedures otherwise required by statute, for use in
appropriate circumstances."
76. Of course, if due process requires oral testimony and cross examination, the informal hearing proce-
dure is not appropriate. Section 11445.20 begins "an agency may use an informal hearing procedure in any of
the following proceedings, if in the circumstances its use does not violate another statute or the federal or
state Constitution."
77. See, e.g., Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 535-36 (Cal. 1985) (involving denial of a discretionary
application for reimbursement from the State Bar's client security fund).
78. See supra note 57.
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11410.10 (West Supp. 1996).
80. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (west Supp. 1996).
81. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11410.10 cmt. (west 1992) (citing many of the cases); Asimow, Adjudi-
cation Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1083 n.45. For example, if a statute provides a "right of appeal," this
will probably be considered a provision that calls for an evidentiary hearing and thus would be sufficient to
trigger the APA. See Eureka Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 244 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243-45 (Ct. App. 1988).
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of administrative fact-finding evaluation in the nature of a hearing. If the legis-
lature does not intend that the APA should apply, it must explicitly say so. That
seems clearly superior to the federal approach, which requires Congress to af-
firmatively provide that a hearing be "on the record" before the APA will ap-
ply. Such a measure is also superior to the overbroad Model Act approach that
sweeps every state/private interaction under the APA regardless of any external
requirement that a hearing be held.
C. Provisions In the Bill of Rights
The bill of rights extends various fundamental due process projections to
all Tier 1 and Tier 2 adjudications.82 The most important rights relate to the
prohibition on ex parte contact83 and the requirement of separation of func-
tions.84 Here the Federal APA provides a useful signpost, because its across-
the-board provisions on ex parte contact and separation of functions have
proved to be practical and useful.' The successful federal provisions inspired
the drafters of the 1981 Model Act to go further.86 California's new APA
builds on these models.8 7
1. Ex parte communications
By the term "ex parte communication," I mean communications between
interested outsiders and agency adjudicators.8 All APAs limit or prohibit out-
sider ex parte communications, since such contacts are deeply antithetical to an
adversary system.89 The original California APA contained no provision pro-
hibiting ex parte contact. In 1986, the APA was amended to prohibit ex parte
contact with ALJs (though not agency heads) in Tier 1 agencies."° Anecdotal
evidence available to the author indicated that agency heads occasionally en-
gage in ex parte contact.9' A couple of recently enacted statutes and regula-
82. The bill of rights thus covers all adjudications in which a statute or constitution requires an eviden-
tiary hearing except in the few agencies excluded from the Act.
83. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 11430.10-11430.80 (West Supp. 1996).
84. See id. §§ 11425.30, 11430.10, 11430.30.
85. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1994).
86. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 §§ 4-213, 4-214, 15 U.L.A. 88-90
(1990).
87. See supra notes 83-84.
88. There are two different kinds of problematic off-record communications with adjudicators: i) by
outside "interested parties" and ii) by inside agency staff members. These two types of communication present
quite different considerations. I refer only to the first as "ex pane contact." I consider the second type as part
of the problem of "separation of functions." The two types of communication are treated separately in the
Federal APA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d).
The Commission originally treated the two kinds of communications separately, but these provisions
proved unwieldy. Ultimately, the Commission found it easier from a drafting perspective to describe both
kinds of communications as ex parte communications while designing special exceptions for staff communica-
tions. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11430.10-11430.80 (West Supp. 1996). This approach is also employed in
the 1981 Model Act. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-213(a).
89. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1127-28.
90. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11513.5 (West 1992), repealed by S.B. 523 § 41; Asimow, Adjudication
Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1128.
91. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note I], at 1130-31.
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tions have prohibited or limited ex parte contact in specific agencies, suggesting
an emerging consensus that such contact is improper.'
The originally enacted Federal APA also contained no prohibition on ex
parte contact. However, as the result of some notorious instances of ex parte
contacts, especially by television license applicants with agency heads,93 in
1976 Congress prohibited such contacts.94 Similarly, the 1981 Model Act
broadly prohibits ex parte contacts." The federal provision seems to have
worked well and has been resoundingly enforced by several well-known court
decisions.96
The federal and Model Act provisions establish that it is both feasible and
desirable to force all significant communications between interested outsiders
and agency adjudicators97 out of the office and onto the record. There are no
important exceptions to this principle in the Federal Act9 and there are none
in California's adjudicatory bill of rights?
92. The Public Utilities Commission had long tolerated ex parte contact and resisted attempts to limit it.
CPUC capitulated by adopting a regulation that does not prohibit ex parte communication but requires dis-
closure of the content of the communications. See id. at 1130-34. The legislature required disclosure of ex
parte contact in connection with Coastal Commission determinations. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30322-
30324 (West Supp. 1996).
93. See Cornelius J. Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with Administrative
Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REV. 233, 234, 239-43 (1962).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1994), added by the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409,
§ 4(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1246 (1976) (prohibiting "[an] interested person outside the agency" from making "an
ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the proceeding" to any "employee who is or may reasonably
be expected to be involved in the decisional process").
95. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-213(a), 15 U.L.A. 88 (1990).
96. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993);
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
97. The California statute uses the term "presiding officers" to cover adjudicators, This term includes the
agency head or heads, an administrative law judge, hearing officer, or other person who presides in an adjudi-
catory hearing. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11405.80, 11430.70(a) (West Supp. 1996). The term "presiding
officer" is also used in the 1981 Model Act, but it is never defined. Therefore, it is unclear whether the ban
on ex parte contact includes agency heads as well as hearing officers. In context, however, Model Act § 4-
216(d) indicates that "presiding officer" probably does include agency heads.
98. Unlike the Federal Act, California makes no exception for requests by legislators to agency heads for
"status reports." See 5 U.S.C. § 551(14).
99. In one respect, the California provision is narrower than both its federal and Model Act counterparts.
It does not prohibit ex parte contacts with adjudicatory advisers unless such contacts are part of an indirect
attempt to influence the adjudicators. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.10 (West Supp. 1996). Compare 5
U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-213(b)(i). The Commission
feared that a blanket ban on ex parte contact with advisers (especially ones not yet tapped as advisers at the
time of the contact) might cause serious practical problems, especially in difficult economic, technical, or
environmental cases. See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 759, 762 (1981) [hereinafter Asimow, When the Curtain Falls].
There are some insignificant exceptions which are consistent with federal law. For example, ex parte
contact is permitted concerning "a matter of procedure or practice, including a request for a continuance, that
is not in controversy." This reflects a comment in Model Act § 4-214, and federal law. See Texas v. United
States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that letters concerning noncontroversial procedural ques-
tion did not prohibit ex parte communication because they did not concern merits). Also § 11430.70(b) of the
California Government Code contains a narrow exception for ratemaking. Communications with agency heads
are not prohibited but must be disclosed. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.70(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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2. Separation of functions
A historic administrative law dilemma concerns the combination of con-
flicting functions within the same agency. Many agencies adopt regulations,
investigate violations of statute or regulations, prosecute alleged violators, adju-
dicate the issue of whether a violation occurred and prescribe the appropriate
penalty. Combining all these functions in the same agency may well serve the
causes of efficiency and accuracy, but regulated parties generally find the com-
bination unfair and objectionable.'"
In California, the inherent problem of combining functions is often solved
by an external separation; different agencies handle the conflicting roles."0'
Nevertheless, a number of California agencies combine functions, especially
those engaged in professional licensing.'" Most agencies that incorporate
combined functions create an internal separation of functions, meaning that: i)
agency staff members or members of the Attorney General's staff who have
played adversary roles in a particular case (such as investigation, prosecution, or
advocacy) cannot play adjudicatory roles in that same case, and ii) adversaries
in a case cannot furnish ex parte advice to adjudicators in that case.' 3 Howev-
er, anecdotal evidence available to me suggests that the principle has sometimes
been ignored or fudged, especially in understaffed agencies, in agencies where
informal procedures prevail, or in nonaccusatory cases involving utility regula-
tion, tax, environmental, and land-use issues.' 4
In my view, a system of internal separation of functions is imperative,
given the adversarial nature of administrative dispute settlement." In most
situations, existing California law does not mandate internal separation of
functions."l In 1986, the legislature amended the California APA to prohibit
contact between a central panel AD and an employee of the agency that filed
an accusation.'" However, this provision covers only Tier 1 agencies and ap-
pears to apply only at the ALJ level, not the agency head level.' 8 Some par-
ticularly egregious cases of combined functions violate state or federal due pro-
100. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 1, at 1154-68.
101. See supra note 14.
102. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11 at 1148, 1153.
103. As previously noted, the State Board of Equalization, California's tax adjudicating agency, does not
observe internal separation of functions. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
104. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1168.
105. For a theoretical defense of this proposition, see Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note 99, at
788-97.
106. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1168-70.
107. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513.5(a) (West 1992), repealed by S. B. 523, § 41. The Assembly bill
that produced § 11513.5 contained a broader separation of functions provision but it was struck out of the
version that passed the Senate, probably because of strong agency opposition. See Asimow, Adjudication
Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1168 n.342.
108. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1128 n.194.
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cess,0 9 but the contours of the constitutional separation of functions doctrine
are unclear.
Here again, the Federal APA has lighted the way. From the beginning, it
has mandated internal separation of functions.' This provision appears to
work well, causes few practical problems,"' and is seldom litigated. Federal
agencies customarily require internal separation, often in ways that go beyond
what is required by statute."2 Following the Federal Act and the 1981 Model
Act," the bill of rights mandates separation of adjudicatory functions from
adversarial functions such as prosecution, investigation, and advocacy. It pro-
hibits persons who have played adversarial roles in a case from functioning as
adjudicators in the same case."4 It also prohibits adversary staff members
from making off-record contacts with adjudicators, for example by furnishing
advice.'
Of equal importance, the Act permits ex parte communication to adjudica-
tors from staff members who have not played adversary roles in the proceed-
ing." 6 In my view, it is imperative that agency decisionmakers (particularly at
the agency head level) in complex, unusually important, or unusually difficult
cases have the ability to draw on agency staff experts for legal, technical, or
policy advice. These are cases that involve substantial stakes for the parties and
for the public interest. The decisionmakers need the richest possible mix of
109. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note 99, at 779-88; Asimow, Adjudication Fundamen-
tals, supra note 11, at 1165-66 (federal cases), 1169 (California). By "particularly egregious," I mean a mix-
ture of functions in a particular individual below the level of agency heads which i) presents a high risk of
erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally-protected interest and ii) which lacks a convincing practical justifi-
cation. Id. at 1166. For example, the Court of Appeal held that the County Counsel could advise an adjudica-
tive board even though a deputy county counsel had been an adversary in the same case, but only if the
County Counsel were screened from any prior communications about the case with the deputy. See Howitt v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1992).
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994).
11. But see William F. Pedersen, Jr., The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64
VA. L. REV. 991, 1014-15 (1978) (suggesting a rollback in separation of functions practice in non-prosecuto-
rial cases such as environmental protection).
112. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note 99, at 804-20.
113. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-214, 15 U.L.A. 89-90 (1990).
114. See CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11425.30 (West Supp. 1996). This provision also disqualifies a person from
serving as an adjudicative decisionmaker if that person is subject to the supervision of one who has served as
an adversary in the same case. Section 11425.30 does not apply to drivers' license adjudications because of
the budgetary problems inherent in separating functions at the Department of Motor Vehicles. See CAL. VEH.
CODE § 14112 (West Supp. 1996).
Participation in a determination of probable cause or other equivalent preliminary determination does
not disqualify a person from serving as an adjudicator. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.30(b)(2). This provi-
sion follows the Model Act § 4-214(c) and federal case law. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note
99, at 767-68, 770-72. Thus agency heads can participate in the decision whether to investigate a particular
person or to issue a complaint against that person, then subsequently adjudicate the case. Often this prelimi-
nary exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the most important decision in the case, since the person is likely
to settle if the agency proceeds against him. Nevertheless, such discussions inevitably expose decisionmakers
to ex parte information about the case and it may be better practice to avoid agency head involvement even at
preliminary stages, at least in prosecutorial cases. See id. at 767-68.
115. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11430.10(a), 11430.30(a) (West Supp. 1996).
116. See iU. § 11430.30(a). This provision allows a communication for the purpose of assistance and
advice to the presiding officer from a staff member who is not an adversary in the particular case. The "assis-
tant or adviser may evaluate the evidence in the record but shall not furnish, augment, diminish or modify the
evidence in the record." Id.
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advisory resources." 7 Separation of functions must be defined and adminis-
tered in ways that permit decisionmakers access to needed staff advice except in
cases where the adviser has significant adversarial involvement in the case
under decision." 8
The separation of functions provision in the Federal APA contains an
"agency heads" exemption."9 The meaning of the agency head exemption re-
mains obscure to this day. The exemption apparently is intended to allow agen-
cy heads to personally engage in combined functions; for example, an agency
head could both investigate, advocate the agency's side, then adjudicate the
case. Although this is obviously not an ideal situation from the point of view of
fairness, it may be supported by the principle of necessity, especially in a small,
understaffed agency. However, the agency head exception probably does not
allow staff adversaries to advise the agency heads ex parte; the statute permits
only non-adversaries to give advice.'
Neither the 1981 Model Act nor the new California statute contains an
agency head exception. This omission reflects a policy decision that if an agen-
cy must embody combined functions, all adjudicators - up to and including
the heads of the agency - should steer clear of adversary involvement and
must be advised only by non-adversaries. Administrative law has evolved sub-
stantially in the 50 years since the federal act was passed. At least in a state
like California with relatively large agency staffs, there is no persuasive argu-
ment that justifies allowing agency heads to take a personal role in investiga-
tion, prosecution, or advocacy and then adjudicate the same case, or that justi-
fies allowing staff adversaries to give off-record advice.'
117. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note 99, at 764, 775-76, 800-03.
118. The drafters of the California provision wanted to minimize some of the efficiency costs of an overly
strict system of separation of functions. Therefore, the Act prohibits ex parte communications to adjudicators
from outsiders and staff adversaries but not communications from adjudicators to outsiders or staff adversar-
ies. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.10(a) (West Supp. 1996). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(B) (1994) with
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE Acr OF 1981 § 4-213(a).
The provision was drafted this way to order to allow agency heads to impose management controls
over the way in which the staff conducts difficult or complex cases. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls,
supra note 99, at 802-03. The Comment to § 11430.10 explains: "Thus [the section] would not prohibit an
agency head from communicating to an adversary that a particular case should be settled or dismissed. How-
ever, a presiding officer should give assistance or advice with caution, since there may be an appearance of
unfairness if assistance or advice is given to some parties but not others." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.10 cmt.
(West Supp. 1996).
In addition, the California Act allows certain adversary/adjudicator communications concerning techni-
cal issues in non-prosecutorial cases provided that the advice is disclosed on the record. See id.
§ 11430.30(c)(1). And to avoid disturbing existing decisionmaking patterns in statewide land use planning
agencies, such communications are allowed in several agencies. See id. § 11430(c)(2).
119. "This subsection [section 554(d)] does not apply... (c) to the agency or a member of members of
the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C).
120. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls, supra note 99, at 766-67.
121. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1177-78. For similar reasons, the Cali-
fornia act has no exceptions that correspond to the federal exceptions for initial licensing or to proceedings
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3. ALJ credibility determinations
Under long-standing California law and practice, an ALJ's proposed deci-
sion counted for nothing if it was rejected by the agency heads.' Agency
heads were free to substitute their own findings about witness credibility for
those of the ALJ, even though they did so without seeing or hearing the wit-
nesses. As a result, agency heads who disagreed with the result reached by the
ALJ could readily reach a different result by substituting their own credibility
findings.
Under existing law, reviewing courts that apply the substantial evidence
test consider only the findings of the agency heads, not those of the ALL Under
California's unique independent judgment test, applicable in cases where an
agency decision deprives a private party of a vested, fundamental right,"n the
fact findings of neither the ALJ nor the agency heads have any legal effect. The
reviewing court makes its own credibility determinations from the cold re-
cord.124
One important goal of the Federal APA was to upgrade the status of ad-
ministrative hearing officers."as The famous Universal Camera'26 decision
helped to achieve that objective. In Universal Camera, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that on judicial review, courts review the decision of the agency heads,
not the decision of the ALL27 Nevertheless, the Court held that where an
ALl's credibility findings differ from those of the agency heads, these differ-
ences detract from the substantiality of the evidence supporting the agency's
decision."a As a practical matter, therefore, federal agency heads seldom over-
turn the credibility determinations of their ALJs, since doing so invites a re-
viewing court to overturn the agency's decision.'29
Senate Bill 523 is concerned with agency adjudication, not judicial review.
Nevertheless, the bill of rights adopts the Universal Camera principle in Cali-
fornia,3 ' although with a substantial refinement: the court must give great
122. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1113-15. In workers' compensation
cases, however, reviewing courts gave "great weight" to the findings of Workers' Compensation Judges. See
id. at 1116.
123. See "Scope of Judicial Review," supra note 11, at 1161-92.
124. Review by appellate courts of trial court fact findings under the independent judgment test is ex-
tremely narrow. See id. at 1168-69.
125. It did so by sharply restricting agency authority to hire, supervise, monitor, and discharge its hearing
officers (later renamed ALJs). See generally, ACUS REPORT, supra note 40, at 803 passim.
126. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
127. See id. at 494-97.
128. See id. at 496.
129. See, e.g., Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
130. Section 11425.50(b) provides: "If the factual basis for the decision includes a determination based
substantially on the credibility of a witness, the statement shall identify any specific evidence of the observed
demeanor, manner, or attitude of the witness that supports the determination, and on judicial review the court
shall give great weight to the determination to the extent the determination identifies the observed demeanor,
manner, or attitude of the witness that supports it." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50(b) (West Supp. 1996).
The comment to this provision (omitted from the 1996 pocket part of West's California Government
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weight to credibility findings.3 only to the extent that the statement of factual
basis for the decision identifies specific evidence of the observed demeanor,
manner, or attitude of the witness that supports the determination.' Thus,
when the bill of rights goes into effect in 1997, a court in a substantial evidence
case must downgrade the substantiality of evidence supporting the agency
heads' decision if the agency heads differ from the ALJ on a credibility issue,
assuming the ALJ made the appropriate findings. In an independent judgment
case, the court must give great weight to the AL's credibility findings, thus
significantly decreasing the court's power to impose its own determinations.
In my view, enactment of the Universal Camera principle in California is
a landmark achievement. It tends to mute complaints from the private bar that
agency heads, especially in agencies with combined functions, can carry out
their political agendas by substituting their own credibility findings for those of
the judge who actually heard the witnesses. It enhances the status of adminis-
trative judges; they are trained, experienced, professional fact finders who have
lived with a case and whose determinations about who is telling the truth
should not be negated by agency heads who did not hear the witnesses, who
may have spent relatively little time on the case, and who may or may not have
read the transcript.'
This provision was staunchly opposed by several agencies and questioned
by the Attorney General. Nevertheless, the Commission stuck to its guns and
the provision was ultimately enacted. The federal model was enormously signif-
icant in helping to secure enactment of the provision. When people questioned
what the "great weight" provision meant or argued that it improperly derogated
from agency head authority, the effective response was: the federal courts do it
and everyone at the federal level understands it. It works smoothly, without
causing much apparent problem for reviewing courts. Without the powerful
Universal Camera precedent, the principle would never have survived the oppo-
sition of agencies and the Attorney General.
D. Flexibility Enhancing Provisions
The bill of rights provides a list of baseline due process requirements.
These constraints are balanced by a set of provisions designed to give agencies
additional flexibility and to make adjudication less formal, costly, and ad-
versarial. In my view, these provisions are more important in the long run than
131. "Nothing in subdivision (b) precludes the agency head or court from overturning a credibility deter-
mination of the presiding officer, after giving the observational elements of the credibility determination great
weight, whether on the basis of nonobservational elements of credibility or otherwise ... nor does it preclude
the agency head from overturning a factual finding based on the presiding officer's assessment of expert wit-
ness testimony." Id. § 11425.50 cmt.
132. As the comment to § 11425.50 explains, this provision was derived from Washington law. See
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 34.05.461(3), 34.05.464(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); Asimow, Adjudication
Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1118.
133. See Asimow, Adjudication Fundamentals, supra note 11, at 1114-16.
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the bill of rights because they will initiate the creation of a new adjudicatory
culture in California.
1. Alternate dispute resolution
In both civil litigation and in all facets of administrative law, the alterna-
tive dispute resolution ("ADR") movement has won powerful support.134 Vir-
tually everyone agrees that mechanisms should be in place to facilitate and en-
courage dispute settlement without formal adjudication. In most situations, a
negotiated settlement is preferable to the costly, slow, and emotionally exhaust-
ing process of adjudication and judicial review. In this era of backlogged dock-
ets, staggering private and public litigation costs, and diminishing resources
available to agencies, ADR takes on enhanced importance. Agencies and private
attorneys cannot be compelled to develop a culture that favors settlement over
adversary struggle, but an APA can help by legitimizing various ADR tech-
niques (so that their legality cannot be questioned) and encouraging agencies to
put in place settlement-facilitating mechanisms.
In 1990, Congress amended the Federal APA in order to require agencies
to explore and utilize ADR techniques in all agency functions, including adjudi-
cation and rulemaking.'35 The Federal APA now empowers a presiding officer
to use ADR techniques and to require the attendance of parties at settlement
conferences. It also provides that the presiding officer may inform the parties as
to the availability of ADR techniques and to encourage their use.'36 The stat-
ute authorizes and encourages agencies to use the whole range of ADR tech-
niques: settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration.'37 The statute makes clear that these techniques are
voluntary and not always appropriate (for example, where an authoritative reso-
lution of a matter is required to establish a precedent). 3
Prior to enactment of California's new APA, the legality and propriety of
the use of ADR techniques in administrative law was open to doubt in Califor-
nia. Some agencies employed settlement judges to facilitate negotiated settle-
ment but this procedure was often not available or was pursued half heartedly.
134. Section 465(d) of the California Business and Professions Code declares "[c]ourts, prosecuting au-
thorities, law enforcement agencies, and administrative agencies should encourage greater use of alternative
dispute resolution techniques whenever the administration of justice will be improved." CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 465(d) (Vest 1990).
135. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). The Act is
concisely summarized in Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Report of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, S. REP. NO. 101-543, at 7-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931, 3937-46. The Act re-
quires agencies to appoint a dispute resolution specialist and provide training for all employees engaged in
implementing an ADR program. In 1990, Congress also passed a related piece of legislation, the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 497 (1990), to foster ADR techniques in
rulemaking.
136. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(c)(6), (7), (8) (1994).
137. See id. §§ 574-80. The most detailed provisions concern arbitration. See id. To allay constitutional
concerns, the head of an agency is authorized to terminate an arbitration proceeding after the arbitrator makes
an award but before it becomes final. See id.
138. See id. § 572(b).
1996]
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Mediation and arbitration were seldom, if ever, employed as substitutes for
formal adjudication.
The new APA broadly validates ADR in administrative adjudication. First
it provides for settlements on any terms the parties determine are appropri-
ate. 139 In general, settlement can occur before or after issuance of an agency
pleading." Agency heads can delegate the power to. approve a settlement to
lower level officials. 4' Second, the Act strongly validates all other ADR
methods, assuming both parties agree. It specifically empowers agencies to
engage in mediation and either binding or non-binding arbitration. 2
These ADR-validating provisions are of enormous importance in changing
the culture of administrative law. The Commission's proposals for ADR ran
into an uneasy reaction from agencies and the Attorney General. It is doubtful
if these provisions would have survived the lengthy process of Commission
consideration had there not been such a strong federal precedent.
2. Informal hearings
The prior California APA 43 and the Federal APA'" provide for only
one kind of hearing - formal trial-type adjudication. This procedure has virtu-
ally all the formalities of a trial in court. 45 While this approach is appropriate
139. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11415.60(a) (West Supp. 1996). "[T]he settlement may include sanctions
the agency would otherwise lack power to impose." Id. § 11415.60(c). This provision confirms the decision in
Rich Vision Centers, Inc. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 192 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Ct. App, 1983). The Rich deci-
sion holds that a licensing agency has implied power to settle cases, including an agreement that imposes the
agency's litigation and investigation costs on the licensee. See id.
140. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11415.60(b) (West Supp. 1996). However, in a "proceeding to determine
whether an occupational license should be revoked, suspended, limited or conditioned, a settlement may not
be made before issuance of the agency pleading." Id. This exception reflected concern that an agency might
be viewed as covering up violations if it settled cases prior to issuing a complaint. The issue was unclear
under prior law. See Richard H. Cooper, Resolving Real Estate Disciplinary Matters Prior to Hearing, 47
CAL. ST. B.J. 330, 363-64 (1972).
However, the exception is unfortunate; if a case can be settled prior to issuance of a complaint to the
satisfaction of the agency staff and the respondent, it seems unnecessary and counterproductive to first issue a
complaint. If the staff believes that issuance of a complaint is necessary as a matter of consumer protection,
obviously it can insist on that as a condition of settlement.
141. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11415.60(c) (West Supp. 1996). Under prior law and practice, a significant
deterrent to settlement of cases was that only the agency heads had the authority to approve a settlement; a
deal negotiated by the parties, perhaps with the help of a settlement judge, could not be finalized until it was
passed on by the agency heads. Yet in many cases, the heads meet infrequently and this entailed substantial
delay and uncertainty. The general consensus was that agency heads lacked power to delegate this authority.
Hopefully, the new provision will encourage such delegations.
142. See id. § 11420.10. The Act also provides for confidentiality of communications made during the
ADR process. See id. § 11420.30. It empowers OAH to adopt model ADR regulations relating to selection of
mediators or arbitrators, their qualifications, and confidentiality. See id. § 11420.20. The Commission was not
impressed by arguments that binding arbitration represented an invalid delegation of adjudicatory power.
Since the decision to enter into binding arbitration must be voluntarily made on a case-by-case basis by both
the agency and the outside party, it is difficult to see how any important constitutional principle could be
jeopardized. Here the California act departs from the federal model which does not provide for truly binding
arbitration. See supra note 138.
143. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11500-11529 (West 1992), especially § 11513.
144. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1994).
145. This generalization is not strictly true of the Federal APA which authorizes various short-cuts from
formal adjudicatory procedure in specific types of cases. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (determining claims for
benefits or initial licenses, agency can adopt procedure for submission of evidence in written form where
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for many agency adjudications, particularly those that are prosecutorial in na-
ture, many other proceedings do not require such costly formality. An informal,
less adversarial approach would be cheaper, quicker, and less emotionally ex-
hausting to the participants, yet it would not sacrifice any necessary protections
for the litigants.
Recently some state laws have institutionalized informal hearings"4 and
the 1981 Model Act followed suit with its provision for conference hear-
ings. A conference hearing is one that dispenses with direct and cross ex-
amination and instead resolves issues through written submission and oral argu-
ment. " California's new APA provides for an "informal hearing" model that
approximates the Model Act's conference hearing."
Under the California approach, the informal hearing model can be used
without adoption of an authorizing rule 5' in cases involving no disputed issue
of material fact' or, if facts are disputed, a relatively trivial impact on the
private party," or in cases where due process, but no statute, calls for a hear-
ing.'53 In addition, the informal approach can be used in any other type of
case where the agency has authorized its use by regulation.'54
An informal hearing includes all of the protective provisions of the bill of
rights - for example, prohibition on ex parte contact, protection against biased
adjudicators, separation of functions, proper notice, and a statement of findings
and reasons.'55 The officer who presides over an informal hearing must permit
party will not be prejudiced thereby).
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (vest 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:11 (Michie Supp. 1996);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10123 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-604 (1995).
147. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 §§ 4-401 to 4-403, 15 U.L.A. 100-03 (1990).
This provision was adopted in Kansas. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-533 (1989).
148. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-402.
149. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11445.10-11445.60 (West Supp. 1996). In § 11445.10, the legislature de-
clared:
(1) The informal hearing procedure is intended to satisfy due process and public policy require-
ments in a manner that is simpler and more expeditious than hearing procedures otherwise required
by statute, for use in appropriate circumstances.
(2) The informal hearing procedure provides a forum in the nature of a conference in which a
party has an opportunity to be heard by the presiding officer.
(3) The informal hearing procedure provides a forum that may accommodate a hearing where by
regulation or statute a member of the public may participate without appearing or intervening as a
party.
150. The Model Act requires that conference hearings be authorized by an agency rule. See MODEL
STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-401. California does not require that an authorizing rule be
adopted in cases where there is no disputed issue of material fact or in which the sanction is relatively trivial.
California rulemaking is burdensome and costly and the Commission sought to avoid unnecessary rulemaking
requirements. In addition, a requirement of advance rulemaking would surely operate to prevent use of infor-
mal hearings in many situations where they would be useful, either because the agency has not gotten around
to adopting a rule or because rules already adopted overlooked particular situations in which informal hearings
would be appropriate.
151. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11445.20(a) (West Supp. 1996).
152. These include cases that involve a monetary amount of not more than $1000; a student disciplinary
sanction short of expulsion or suspension for more than ten days; an employee sanction that does not involve
discharge, demotion, or suspension for more than five days; a licensee sanction that does not involve revoca-
tion or suspension for more than five days. See id. § 11445.20(b).
153. See id. § 11445.20(d); see also supra notes 73-76.
154. Obviously, this provision could not apply where a formal hearing is required by some other statute
or by state or federal due process. See id. § 11445.20 cmt.
155. The bill of rights applies to all adjudicative proceedings. See id. §§ 11425.10(a), 11445.10 cmt.
25
Asimow: The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on Cali
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the parties, and may permit others, 156 to offer written or oral comments on the
issues. However, "[t]he presiding officer may limit the use of witnesses, testi-
mony, evidence 57 and argument, and may limit or eliminate the use of
pleadings, intervention, discovery, prehearing conferences, and rebuttal."'' 8
The informal hearing procedure is an important innovation in administra-
tive law. The Model Act provisions are carefully thought out and provided a
useful starting point in drafting the California act. In this respect, the Federal
Act has lagged badly behind state law innovation. It calls for more formality
than is needed in many cases, thus needlessly increasing the costs, delays, and
adversariness of proceedings. Moreover, the rigidity of the Federal Act has
produced a very negative consequence. Because the Federal Act provides only
for formal hearings, presided over exclusively by ALJs whose hiring and reten-
tion are heavily regulated by statute, Congress has increasingly circumvented
the APA entirely when it provides for new systems of regulation. 9 Thus the
Federal Act applies to a declining share of the total universe of federal adjudi-
catory proceedings. This was an instance in which federal practice provided a
model that California wisely chose to avoid.
IV. CONCLUSION
California's new APA represents a sharp break with the past. For the first
time, most significant adjudication by California state agencies is subject to a
firm set of baseline provisions requiring fair adjudication. And for the first time,
those agencies have discretion to conduct their adjudication in ways that may be
less formal, costly, and adversarial than in the past. In this process, the Com-
mission drew on the experience of both state and federal governments. The
Federal APA provided a fixed star that the Commission could steer by. Often it
followed the star, as in the case of the provisions relating to ex parte contact,
separation of functions, deference to AD credibility decisions, and ADR.
Sometimes it steered away, as in the case of the provision defining which adju-
dicatory proceedings would be covered and in the case of informal hearings.
And sometimes, peculiarities of California law, practice, or politics determined
156. In this respect, California departs from the Model Act which allows only the parties to participate.
See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-402(3), 15 U.L.A. 102 (1990). The draftsmen be-
lieved that the informal approach might be very useful in cases involving substantial non-party participation
such as environmental and land use planning disputes.
157. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11445.50 (West Supp. 1996). The presiding officer may permit cross-exam-
ination in an informal hearing, provided that the delay, burden or complication due to allowing it will be
minimal; if the burden would be more than minimal, the case should be converted to a formal hearing. See id.
§ 11445.50(a). The "[algency, by regulation, may specify categories of cases in which cross-examination is
deemed not necessary... under the informal hearing procedure ... [, but the] presiding officer may allow
cross-examination notwithstanding ... [al regulation if it appears ... necessary." Id. § 11445.50(b). And the
presiding officer's actions in deciding to permit cross-examination, or in converting the proceeding to a for-
mal procedure in order to allow more cross examination, are not subject to judicial review. See id.
§ 11445.50(c).
158. Id. § 11445.40(b).
159. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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the outcome, as in the case of the special treatment of licensing agencies and
the exclusion from the Act of the Public Utilities Commission and State Board
of Equalization.
Fifty years of experience under the Federal APA has validated the wisdom
and prescience of its draftsmen. Their work has endured while the world of
federal regulation changed in ways they could scarcely have imagined. This
gold mine of experience and precedent is of incalculable value to anyone who
sets out on the task of updating a state's APA. It is a tribute to the Federal
APA, now in its fifty-first year of existence, that so much of the new California
act was inspired by its provisions.
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